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Abstract
Discussion in this Essay is designed to explore recently introduced efficiency considerations
and to compare developing law in the United States and the European Union. The following
sections discuss why incorporation of efficiency factors has been controversial, explore efficiency
analysis in connection with mergers under U.S. law, explore comparable developments in EU law,
and, finally, offer a comparison of developments in the two jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION
The question of introducing efficiency considerations into
merger review has been lively and controversial for many years.
Of course, most mergers are between companies that are too
small or too remote in competitive effects to endanger competi-
tion. A relative few-less than five percent in both the United
States and the European Union-approach monopoly or domi-
nant firm dimensions, or threaten the welfare of consumers by
allowing combined firms to raise prices or reduce output with-
out effective response from others, and, as a result, are carefully
examined.1 Both dangers to competition are now acknowledged
in U.S.2 and EU3 law. The question addressed here is whether
some few mergers, close to the line of legality, can be justified by
considerations of efficiency.
* Joseph and Madeline Sheehy Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
School; Of Counsel, Arnold & Porter.
1. See, e.g., Richard G. Parker & David A. Balto, The Evolving Approach to Merger
Remedies, 2000 ANTITRUST REP. 2 (2000); Mergers and Corporate Consolidation in the New
Economy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on theJud., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Rob-
ert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n), available at http://NVWw.ftc.gov/os/1998/
06/merger98.tes.htm. Examination of European merger statistics reveals a ratio of en-
forcement actions to horizontal mergers similar to that at the FTC. See Eur. Comm'n,
Directorate-General for Competition, European Merger Control-Council Regulation
139/2004-Statistics, Sept. 21 1990-Feb. 28 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
competition/mergers/statistics.pdf (last visited May 17, 2007) (compiling historical
data reflecting level of scrutiny given proposed mergers over time in question).
2. DEP'T OF J. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2-3 (rev.
1997) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GuIDELINES], available at http://wv.uscloj.
gov/atr/hmerger/ 11251.pdf.
3. Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regula-
tion on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings ("EC Horizontal Merger
Guidelines"), O.J. C 31/5 (2004) (guidelines to appraise concentrations within the
scope of the Merger Regulation, Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004,
O.J. L 24/1 (2004)).
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Both the United States and the European Union appear to
have accepted, in recent years, that mergers can contribute to
efficiency (for example by introducing cost savings, economies
of scale, or facilitating innovation), and these efficiencies may
occur in markets where they are likely to be passed on to con-
sumers to an extent that the efficiencies outweigh any likely an-
ticompetitive effect. Both jurisdictions have been slow to reach
this conclusion and formally to introduce efficiency considera-
tions into merger analysis. Even today, there are critics who
doubt that the acknowledgement of relevance of efficiencies is
more than an empty commitment, and who believe efficiency is
not a practical factor in merger review.4
Discussion in this Essay is designed to explore recently intro-
duced efficiency considerations and to compare developing law
in the United States and the European Union. The following
sections discuss why incorporation of efficiency factors has been
controversial, explore efficiency analysis in connection with
mergers under U.S. law, explore comparable developments in
EU law, and, finally, offer a comparison of developments in the
two jurisdictions.
I. PROS AND CONS OF INTRODUCING EFFICIENCY
CONSIDERATIONS INTO MERGER ANALYSIS
It has been widely accepted for some years in U.S. scholar-
ship that there is a strong case for introducing efficiency consid-
eration into merger review,5 and yet both the United States and
the European Union have been slow to accept formally the rele-
vance of efficiency considerations. There are several reasons
why the issue is controversial. First, efficiency issues are not ex-
pressly recognized in statutes covering merger review in either
jurisdiction, though consideration of such issues is not expressly
foreclosed either.6 Second, opponents of taking efficiency con-
4. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 133-34 (2d ed. 2001); Malcolm B.
Coate, Efficiencies in Merger Analysis: An Institutionalist View, 13 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 189,
231 (2005).
5. See, e.g., IV-A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 970b,
at 25-27 (2d ed. 2006); Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 381, 383 (1980); Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised
United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy, 81 CEO. L.J. 195, 208-209 (1992).
6. See generally Clayton Act § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1996);
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45
(2006); Sherman Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004); Council
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siderations into account have emphasized that efficiencies are
difficult to quantify, especially since they rely entirely on a pre-
diction of the beneficial results of a not yet consummated
merger, and are thus even harder to trade off against anticompe-
titive effects. 7 Advocates argue that the problem can be handled
by placing the burden of proof of the existence of efficiencies
squarely on the people advocating the merger, and requiring
that any claimed efficiencies be clear and substantial.' Third,
skeptics point out that if there are efficiencies of scope or scale,
or of innovation, those can be achieved by internal expansion of
a single firm, or by less restrictive alternatives like joint ventures
or licensing arrangements.9 Advocates for efficiency considera-
tion concede the point, and therefore insist that any claimed ef-
ficiencies be "merger specific"-i.e., as a practical matter, the ef-
ficiency cannot be achieved other than through the proposed
merger."0 Finally, many have pointed out that if the merger
leads to monopoly or near monopoly, any short-term benefits to
consumers will be outweighed in the long term by the ability of
the combined firm to extract monopoly rents.'" Both jurisdic-
tions have responded to this legitimate concern by specifying
that efficiency considerations will not justify mergers to monop-
oly or near monopoly. 2
Regulation No. 139/2004, O.J. L 24/1 (2004) [hereinafter EC Merger Regulation] (on
the control of concentrations between undertakings).
7. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
124-29 (1993 ed.); POSNER, supra note 4, at 133-34; Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande,
Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CAL. L. Rav. 1580, 1585-86 (1983); Mi-
guel de la Mano, For the Customer's Sake: The Competitive Effects of Efficiencies in
European Merger Control I (Enterprise Paper No. 11, 2002), http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/ library/ enterprise-papers/pdf/enterprise-paper- 112002. pdf (last visited
May 17, 2007).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1289 (N.D.
I11. 1989); VI AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, 974a, at 66-67; Coate, supra note 4
at 234-35.
9. See, e.g., Rockford Mem'l Corp., 717 F. Supp. at 1289; VI AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 5, 973b, at 53-61; Pitofsky, supra note 5, at 242.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1175 (N.D. Cal.
2004); Rockford Mem'l Corp., 717 F. Supp. at 1289; VI AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note
5, 973a, at 52-53; Coate, supra note 4, at 196-97; de la Mano, supra note 7, at 1.
11. See, e.g., Coate, supra note 4, at 197-98; de la Mano, supra note 7, at 11; Robert
Pitofsky, Merger Analysis in the '90s: The Guidelines and Beyond-Overview, 61 ANTITRUST
L.J. 147 (1992-1993).
12. See 15 U.S.C. 18 (1996); EC Merger Regulation, para. (29), OJ. L 24/1, at 4
(2004).
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II. EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS IN U.S.
MERGER ENFORCEMENT
The treatment of efficiencies in the United States began
with a notable misstep. In 1962, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States,'3 the U.S. Supreme Court, in the first merger case it con-
sidered after the Clayton Act was thoroughly revised in 1950 to
augment governmental power to challenge mergers,' 4 con-
cluded that efficiencies realized in mergers could weigh against
the legality of a merger:
[Another] significant aspect of this merger is that it creates a
large national chain which is integrated with a manufacturing
operation. The retail outlets of integrated companies, by
eliminating wholesalers and by increasing the volume of
purchases from the manufacturing division of the enterprise,
can market their own brands at prices below those of compet-
ing independent retailers. Of course, some of the results of
large integrated or chain operations are beneficial to con-
sumers. 15
The Court went on to state that it was important to protect
"viable, small, locally-owned businesses" and attributed its deci-
sion to allow consumers to pay higher prices than otherwise
would be necessary to an intention on the part of Congress to
maintain "fragmented industries and markets."6
The misstep was fortunately short-lived. In FTC v. Proctor &
Gamble, Co., 7 the Supreme Court did not repeat the assertion
that efficiencies might turn out to be anticompetitive, but went
so far as to comment:
[P]ossible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality.
Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competi-
tion may also result in economies but it struck the balance in
favor of protecting competition.l
8
For several decades, the Supreme Court's position re-
mained that efficiencies, at best, are neutral with respect to the
merits of a merger. Although the Supreme Court undertook no
13. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
14. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950).
15. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344.
16. Id.
17. 387 U.S. 568 (1967).
18. Id. at 580.
2007] EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATION 1417
additional merger reviews raising substantive issues, the situation
in the United States became increasingly unstable because lower
courts, aware of the Supreme Court's hostility to claims of effi-
ciency as a mitigating factor, nevertheless examined efficiency
questions in merger cases.'" Throughout the period prior to the
mid-1990s, the government's Merger Guidelines acknowledged
that efficiencies might lead the government, as a matter of
prosecutorial discretion, not to challenge a merger, but the vari-
ous formulations with respect to prosecutorial discretion were
always framed in language that indicated strong skepticism that
efficiencies would ever change the result of an otherwise illegal
combination.2 °
The posture of efficiency considerations in the United
States changed in 1997 when the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") and Department ofJustice ("DOJ") amended their Hor-
izontal Merger Guidelines to acknowledge that efficiency consid-
erations not only could influence prosecutorial discretion, but
could justify otherwise illegal mergers facing challenge in
19. See, e.g., FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (11 Cir. 1991) (ac-
knowledging that claims of efficiency can rebut the government's prima facie case, but
finding insufficient evidence in the record); United States v. United Tote Inc., 768 F.
Supp. 1064, 1084-85 (D. Del. 1991) (holding efficiency claims not sufficient to over-
come evidence of anticompetitive effects, particularly because "there are no guarantees
that these savings would be passed on to the consuming public").
20. For example, the 1982 Merger Guidelines state,
Except in extraordinary cases, the Department will not consider a claim of
specific efficiencies as a mitigating factor for a merger that would otherwise be
challenged. Plausible efficiencies are far easier to allege than prove. Moreo-
ver, even if the existence of efficiencies were clear, their magnitudes would be
extremely difficult to determine.
DEP'T oFJ. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, MERGER GUIDELINES 29 (1982), availalable at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/ 1248.pdf. The 1984 Merger Guidelines state,
Because the antitrust laws, and thus the standards of the Guidelines, are de-
signed to proscribe only mergers that present a significant danger to competi-
tion, they do not present an obstacle to most mergers. As a consequence, in
the majority of cases, the Guidelines will allow firms to achieve available effi-
ciencies through mergers without interference from the Department.
Some mergers that the Department otherwise might challenge may be
reasonably necessary to achieve significant net efficiencies. If the parties to
the merger establish by clear and convincing evidence that a merger will
achieve such efficiencies, the Department will consider these efficiencies in
deciding whether to challenge the merger.
DEP'T OFJ. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, MERGER GUIDELINES 23 (1984), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11249.pdf. The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines use
almost identical language. See DEP'T OFJ. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, MERGER GUIDELINES 28
(1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/l1250.pdf.
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court.2 The Guidelines struck the principal theme, at the outset
of the efficiency section, by noting that efficiencies generated by
merger can enhance the merged firm's ability and incentive to
compete, and later, that cognizable efficiencies may be "suffi-
cient to reverse the merger's potential to harm consumers in the
relevant market."22 The new acknowledgement of the role of ef-
ficiencies in merger enforcement was designed to be narrow
(too narrow in the view of many in the U.S. academic commu-
nity and at the Bar), and included the following qualifications:
(1) The alleged efficiencies must be verifiable (i.e., not vague
or speculative);
(2) The efficiencies must be timely, likely and sufficient to
overcome anticompetitive effects;
(3) The efficiencies must be merger-specific (i.e., "unlikely to
be accomplished in the absence of the proposed merger");
(4) The efficiencies must not grow out of an anticompetitive
reduction in output or service (for example, if the reduction
in costs results from closing one of two competing outlets,
that is hardly an efficiency likely to benefit consumers); and
(5) "Efficiencies [will] almost never justify a merger to mo-
nopoly or near-monopoly."
23
In the final paragraph, the Guidelines address the differ-
ences in types of efficiency, noting that efficiencies resulting
from production shifts that reduce cost of production are most
"likely to be susceptible to verification, merger specific and to be
substantial"; that efficiencies relating to research and develop-
ment can be substantial but are "generally less susceptible to ver-
ification"; and that efficiencies relating to procurement, man-
agement or capital costs are the least likely to make a difference
because they are often not merger specific or substantial.24
While the U.S. Guidelines never make the point expressly, the
whole tone of the section strongly indicates that the burden of
proof is squarely on the party asserting the efficiency claim.
There is no recorded instance in the United States where an
otherwise illegal merger was found by a court not to violate the
antitrust laws because of the presence of efficiencies. On the
other hand, there is increasing evidence that efficiency claims, as
21. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 30-31.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 32.
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spelled out in the Guidelines, have had the effect of persuading
enforcement authorities not to challenge proposed mergers. In
the recently published Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines,25 jointly published by the FTC and the Department of Jus-
tice in 2006, the U.S. enforcement agencies issued a report de-
signed to explain how they interpret the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines and to make enforcement decisions more transpar-
ent. Part of the process involved publication of brief explana-
tions of why each agency decided to challenge, or declined to
challenge, reported transactions. In the section of the commen-
tary on efficiencies, the agencies noted five proposed mergers
that were not challenged, where efficiency claims led to that de-
cision, or were significant factors along with other considera-
tions. 26
III. EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS IN EU
MERGER ENFORCEMENT
Like the United States, EU law does not expressly allow or
expressly prohibit efficiency considerations to be taken into ac-
count in merger enforcement. Article 2(1) (b) of the European
Community Merger Regulation ("ECMR") does allow "technical
and economic progress provided it is to the consumers' advan-
tage" to be taken into account, which would appear to open the
door to efficiency claims.2 7 On the other hand, the next phrase
in the ECMR provides that any such technical progress should
"not form an obstacle to competition", which arguably closes the
same door.28 Because of such obscure language, and confusion
about the way the Commission addressed efficiencies in the Aer-
ospatiale/DeHavilland29 and GE/Honeywell3 ° cases, in 2001 the
Commission acknowledged the presence of confusion and for-
mally invited discussion of the role, if any, of efficiency consider-
25. DEP'T OFJ. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (2006) [hereinafter 2006 MERGER COMMENTARY], available at http://www.
ftc.gov/os/2006/03/CommentaryontheHorizontalMergerGuidelinesMarch2006.pdf.
26. See id. at 50, 53, 55, 58 (Nucor-Birmingham Steel, Genzyme-Novazyme, Top-
pan-DuPont, Verizon-MCI, SBC-AT&T).
27. EC Merger Regulation, art. 2(1)(b), OJ. L 24/1, at 7 (2004).
28. Id.
29. Commission Decision No. 91/619/EEC, OJ. L 334/42 (1991) (Aerospatiale-
Alenia/de Havilland).
30. Commission Decision No. 2004/134/EC, OJ. L 48/1 (2001) (General Elec-
tric/Honeywell).
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ations. The majority of responders advocated that efficiency
considerations should be taken into account since they might
contribute to overall economic efficiency and the welfare of con-
sumers.
31
In 2004, the Commission added a detailed description of
efficiency considerations to its Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 2
The main themes of the EU Efficiency Guidelines are strikingly
similar to those of the United States, but in the process of spell-
ing out the Guidelines, some minor but interesting differences
emerge. The overarching theme, touched upon in the introduc-
tion to Section VII of the Guidelines, relating to efficiencies, is
that efficiencies can be generated by a merger that may enhance
the ability or incentive of the merged entity to act pro-competi-
tively for the benefit of consumers, and thereby counteract any
adverse competitive effects. Efficiencies in the context of inno-
vation and research are no less relevant than efficiencies leading
to reduction of costs. 33
The EU discussion of efficiencies is divided into three cate-
gories: (1) benefit to consumers, (2) merger specificity, and
(3) verifiability. 4 While the United States does not break out
discussion in separate categories, the essential direction of the
EU Guidelines is similar to that of the United States.
A. Benefit to Consumers
Among the factors that are quite similar to the U.S. ap-
proach, the EU Guidelines emphasize that the efficiencies must
be substantial and timely-not simply result from restrictions in
output-and are unlikely to justify any mergers that lead to or
approach monopoly.3 5 While the EU Guidelines, like the DOJ-
FTC Guidelines, do not explicitly reject a total welfare standard
in judging efficiencies (i.e., incorporate as efficiencies benefits
to producers as well as consumers), it is fairly clear on the face of
the EU Guidelines that a consumer welfare standard is intended.
One difference is the emphasis in the European Union on
31. Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on the Review of Council
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, arts. 170-72, COM (2001) 745 (Dec. 2001).
32. See EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paras. 76-88, O.J. C 31/5, at 13-14
(2004).
33. See id. para. 81, O.J. C 31/5, at 13 (2004).
34. See id. paras. 76-88, O.J. C 31/5, at 13-14 (2004).
35. See id. para. 79, O.J. C 31/5, at 13 (2004).
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cost efficiencies that lead to reductions in variable or marginal
costs. The EU Guidelines describe variable costs as more likely
to result in lower prices to consumers.36 The U.S. Guidelines
more or less ducked the issue, although they do refer at several
points to "marginal" cost reductions. Since in the long term all
fixed costs become marginal costs, the position advocated in the
economic community that marginal cost savings are more valua-
ble than fixed cost savings, and more likely to be passed on to
consumers, is of questionable validity. It is difficult to believe
that a major reduction in the cost of fixed assets as a result of a
merger would not be likely to reduce costs to consumers-cer-
tainly in the long run-just as would a major reduction in the
cost of ingredients.38
B. Merger Specificity
Like the United States, the EU Guidelines emphasize that
the efficiencies must be "merger-specific"-i.e., could not be
achieved to a similar extent by less anticompetitive alternatives. 39
In both jurisdictions, the burden of proof to demonstrate there
exists no less anticompetitive alternative, is placed squarely on
the party claiming the efficiency. 4°
C. Verifiability
At least on the surface, the EU Guidelines regarding verifi-
cation may be more stringent than in the United States. Effi-
ciencies, where reasonably possible, must be "quantified. 41
Also, the Guidelines emphasize that because the relevant infor-
mation is in the hands of the parties advocating the merger, they
have the burden of proof to show the extent to which the effi-
ciencies would outweigh any adverse consumer effects.42
36. See id. para. 80, O.J. C 31/5, at 13 (2004).
37. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 4.
38. See 2006 MERGER COMMENTARY, supra note 25, at 57-58. In the Commentaries
on the U.S. guidelines, discussed earlier, the U.S. enforcement agencies report they do
consider reductions in fixed costs, though it is clear that they are given less weight than
reductions in variable costs. See id. at 59.
39. See EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 85, O.J. C 31/5, at 14 (2004).
40. See id.; see also HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 4.
41. See EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 86, O.J. C 31/5, at 14 (2004).
42. See id. para. 87, O.J. C 31/5, at 14 (2004).
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IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION
There are a few modest differences between the U.S. and
EU approaches. First, unlike the United States, the European
Union requires that efficiencies and the resulting benefits to
consumers should be "quantified."43 Since efficiencies are a pre-
diction before the merger actually goes through, too much em-
phasis on quantification may undermine the validity of the effi-
ciency claim. Second, the EU describes the type of internal doc-
uments that would support an efficiency claim; particularly,
internal documents used by management to decide on the
merger and historical examples of efficiencies and consumer
benefit.4 4 The U.S. Guidelines do not spell out such details, al-
though perhaps it is self-evident that is the kind of data that
would be most useful. Third, the U.S. Guidelines explain that
certain types of efficiency are most persuasive: Efficiencies re-
sulting from shifting production enabling firms to reduce costs
are more likely to be susceptible to verification; efficiencies relat-
ing to procurement, management, or capital costs are least likely
to be merger-specific or substantial.45 The EU Guidelines do not
expressly address the subject, although some comments indi-
rectly suggest the European Union would be more hospitable to
claims of efficiency leading to innovations than the United
States.4 6
Finally, the U.S. Guidelines address the question of whether
efficiencies in one market can outweigh adverse competitive af-
fects in a separate and distinct market.47 The EU Guidelines
never take up the question. Since the U.S. Guidelines are excep-
tionally obscure on the point,48 Europe may be demonstrating
the better part of wisdom in simply ducking the question.
There are small differences between the Guidelines in the
43. See id. para. 86, O.J. C 31/5, at 14 (2004).
44. See id. para. 88, O.J. C 31/5, at 14 (2004).
45. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 4.
46. See, e.g., EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 81, O.J. C 31/5, at 13 (2004).
47. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 4.
48. See id. § 4 n.36. ("In some cases, however, the Agency in its prosecutorial dis-
cretion will consider efficiencies not strictly in the relevant market, but so inextricably
linked with it that a partial divestiture or other remedy could not feasibly eliminate the
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market without sacrificing the efficiencies in the
other market(s).").
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two jurisdictions, but the similarities clearly outweigh the differ-
ences. In both jurisdictions, the efficiency defense is deliberately
described in a way that makes it difficult to establish. As with the
United States, there is no recorded instance in the EU where an
otherwise illegal merger was found by a court as legal as a result
of efficiencies. There are, however, in the United States, a sub-
stantial number of instances where efficiencies have led prosecu-
tors not to challenge a merger." In the European Union, there
are several press releases in recent years suggesting that investi-
gations were terminated because of likely efficiencies. For exam-
ple, in Korsnas/AD Cartonboard, the press release states that "the
transaction is likely to create synergies which would appear likely
to be at least partly passed on to consumers."50
V. HOLDING EFFICIENCIES AGAINST THE LEGALITY OF
A MERGER
As noted, for a brief period of time, efficiencies under U.S.
law could be held against the legality of a merger.5' Current law
and current guidelines have firmly rejected that position.52 In
the European Union, several decisions appear to have held effi-
ciencies against the legality of a merger, and no case law or
guideline provision indicates that is an erroneous result. An ex-
ample in the EU involves the 1991 Commission decision block-
ing the merger between Aerospatiale, a French manufacturer of
aircraft and other space systems, and De Havilland, a Canadian
company that manufactured turbo-prop aircraft.5 ' The pro-
posed merger was vulnerable on many conventional grounds,
but was notable because the Commission decision found a viola-
tion, in part, due to the ability of the combined firm to furnish a
complete range of products that would offer cost advantages to
buyers, and would reduce the fixed costs of pilot and mechanic
training and the cost of maintaining different in-house invento-
ries. 51 While the Commission never squarely concluded that the
49. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
50. Commission Press Release, IP/06/610 (May 12, 2006).
51. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text (discussing Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)).
52. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 4.
53. Commission Decision No. 91/619/EEC, O.J. L 334/42 (1991) (Aerospatiale-
Alenia/de Havilland).
54. See id. 32.
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efficiencies counted against the legality of the merger, it did
note that the merged group would enjoy benefits that would be
out of the reach of competitors, and implied that that fact added
to the reasons for blocking the transaction.55
More recently, controversy over using possible efficiencies
to challenge mergers has emerged in the conglomerate merger
area in connection with the concept of "portfolio" or "range"
effects. The theory appears to be that a combination by merger
of companies producing complimentary products gives the
merged entity the opportunity to reduce price (by bundling or
otherwise), or improve quality to the detriment of competitors,
and in the long run, of consumers. Under the theory, mergers
are less likely to be approved when the combined company pro-
duces products that are more attractive to buyers. For example,
in Boeing-McDonnell-Douglas,56 the Commission extracted con-
ditions before it approved the merger, knowing that the combi-
nation would produce "commonality benefits" which, in turn,
would lower costs to consumers.5 7
In 2001, the Commission took a far more controversial
stance in blocking the merger of General Electric, the world's
largest manufacturer of jet engines, and Honeywell, the world's
largest manufacturer of aircraft control systems. 58 Again, the
theory was that the combined company would have the opportu-
nity to lower price and improve products through mixed bun-
dling or technological tie-ins.59
Possibly these opinions, which appear equivalent to the
early determination in the United States (in Brown Shoe) that ef-
ficiencies could be held against the legality of mergers, will not
constitute a lasting approach. The opinion of the European
Court of First Instance in GE/Honeywell, affirming on traditional
grounds the decision to block the merger and finding portfolio
or comparable theoretical effects not proven, may be a sign that
55. See id. 69 (suggesting competitors would not be able to withstand pricing
pressure).
56. Commission Decision No. 97/816/EC, 0.J. L 336/16 (1997) (Boeing/McDon-
nell Douglas).
57. See id. 41, 124.
58. Commission Decision No. 2004/134/EC, 0.J. L 48/1 (2001) (General Elec-
tric/Honeywell).
59. See id. 162, 478-81, 483.
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the European Union is changing direction on the role of effi-
ciencies in merger analysis.6"
60. See European Competition Commissioner Mario Monti, Speech at the Confer-
ence on Reform of European Merger Control: Review of the EC Merger Regulation-
Roadmap for the Reform Project, (Jun. 4, 2002), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/02/252&format=HTML&aged=0&lan-
guage=EN&guiLanguage=EN (stating that "there is no such thing as a so-called 'effi-
ciency offense' in EU merger control law and practice."). Attorneys in Europe have
challenged that view. See Robbert Snelders & Simon Genevaz, Merger Efficiencies and Rem-
edies, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: MERGER CONTROL 2007, at
9, 13 (Global Legal Group ed., 2007), available at http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/
Publications/pdf/958.pdf.
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